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 Eddie is a mid-level product salesman for Fox Exports.  Fox hired Eddie as an at-will 
employee and bound him to a non-compete covenant that restricts Eddie‟s ability to work for any 
of Fox‟s competitors within a specified geographic region for two years after the termination of 
their employment relationship.  After working for Fox for roughly two years, Eddie meets a 
manager for Newport Exports, one of Fox‟s competitors, at a local golf outing.  After conversing 
for a while, Newport‟s manager believed Eddie would fit in well with his company and offered 
Eddie a job.  After Eddie accepted the offer, Fox sues Newport for tortious interference.    
 This Note proposes an analytical framework for resolving such disputes and argues that a 
narrow standard of liability is appropriate. A change is needed as the current regime chills 
employers from offering jobs to former employees of competitors, promotes social inefficiency 
by permitting employers to restrict their employee‟s future employment opportunities while 
offering only at-will employment and erects a large barrier to the employee‟s most gainful job 
market. Based on the interplay of the employment-at-will doctrine, noncompetition agreements 
and tortious interference claims, this Note refutes the Restatement (Second) of Torts
2
 approach 
and instead recommends a theory of liability that incorporates aspects of both tortious 
interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations claims.  
Such a liability framework not only safeguards fair competition and embraces employee 
mobility, but also affords employers adequate protection for their legitimate business interests.  
                                                          
1
 Speakers of Sport, Inv. v. Proserv, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.).  
2
 Unless otherwise indicated this Note utilizes the term “Restatement” to refer to the provisions of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  
2 
 
I. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
 
American jurisprudence typically construes employment for an unstated term as a 





 stands for the proposition that an employee can be terminated at 
any time for any reason, good reason or bad reason.
5
  Though the harshest impacts of the 
doctrine have been softened throughout the years,
6
 most workers in the United States who were 
told “You‟re Fired!” had no legal recourse under traditional employment law.
7
 The vast majority 
of American workers
8
 are at-will employees
9
; Montana is the only American state that has not 




                                                          
3
 See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 39 (3d Ed. 
2008); Debbie Ho, Employment Law-Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine-The Adoption of the Public Policy 
Exception in Two Specific Situations Could Signal the Adoption of Additional Exceptions to the Doctrine, 64 MISS. 
L.J. 257, 259 (1994); Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Employment: Going, Going . . . , 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 187 
(1989-1990).  
4
 In 1877, Horace G. Wood proposed the initial version of the employment-at-will rule. H.G. Wood, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 157 (1st ed. 1877). Wood stated that where an employee was hired for an 
indefinite term, it was a prima facie at-will relationship.  Though Wood‟s research and conclusion has since been 
widely criticized, the employment-at-will rule nonetheless became an accepted part of American jurisprudence by 
the end of the 19
th
 century. Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21
st
 Century: A Consideration of 
Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 707-08 (2006) (citing authority).  
5
 See, e.g., Martin Wald & David W. Wolf, Recent Developments in the Law of Employment at Will, 1 LAB.LAW. 
533, 534 (1985); Joseph Z. Fleming, Labor and Employment Law: Recent Developments—At-Will Termination of 
Employment Has Not Been Terminated, 20 NOVA. L. REV. 437 (1995).  
6
 See infra Section I.B for a discussion of the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine.  
7
 Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 8 
(1993). 
8
 Interestingly, although the vast majority of American employees work at-will, it appears that many misunderstand 
the nature of their own employment. For example, “[i]n a 1997 law review article, Pauline T. Kim reported that 89% 
of respondents to her survey, conducted to test employee‟s knowledge of the employment-at-will rule, believed that 
the law forbids a termination based on personal dislike.” Alex Long, The Disconnect Between At-Will Employment 
and Tortious Interference with Business Relations: Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment 
Context, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491 (2001) (hereinafter, “Disconnect”) (citing Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect 
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 
133-34 (1997)).  
9
 See, e.g., Matthew C. Palmer, Where Have You Gone, Law and Economics Judges? Economic Analysis Advice To 
Courts Considering The Enforceability of Covenants Not To Compete Signed After At-Will Employment Has 
Commenced, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1110 (2005).  
10
 Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901 to 915 (2003) (legislatively setting forth a „just-cause‟ default rule). 
3 
 
A. Common Justifications and Criticisms 
 
The employment-at-will doctrine grew primarily out of employer property rights and 
freedom to contract theories.
11
  Indeed, “freedom of contract, while it is no longer a 
constitutional barrier to most regulation of employment, remains the crucial background against 
which all workplace regulation operates and effectively governs most of what takes place within 
the employment relationship.”
12
 At-will relationships are governed by the general rule 
safeguarding lawful competition.
13
 This Note argues that the one of the most important policies 
advanced by the employment-at-will doctrine is the promotion of free and fair competition.
14
  
Accordingly, the doctrine not just permits but encourages employers and employees alike to 
continually re-evaluate their relationship and, if appropriate, search for greener pastures.   
Though apparently
15
 well-settled in American jurisprudence, the doctrine is not without 
critics.  Indeed, in the absence of a statutory or common law exception, the doctrine leaves at-
will employees subject to arbitrary employer action regardless of years of service, firm-specific 
investments or the insubstantiality of the reasons for termination.
16
 Opponents to the at-will rule 
chiefly “focus on the costs to wrongly-fired employees, whether those costs are economic, 
                                                          
11
 Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace: Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1655, 1658 (1996). See also Massingale, supra note 3, at 187 (stating that the at-will employment doctrine 
illustrates the “prevailing principle” that parties are free to determine the terms of their own contract).  
12
 Estlund, supra note 11, at 1658 (internal citation omitted).  
13
 Frank J. Cavico, Tortious Interference with Contract in the At-Will Employment Context, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 503, 539-40 (2002) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 768 cmt. e. (1977)).  
14
 See Yoichiro Hamabe, Japan Trade: Inadvertent Support of Traditional Employment Practices: Impediments to 
the Internationalization of Japanese Employment Law, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 306, 306 (1994) (noting that the 
American at-will employment system arguably promotes fair and free competition for workers and jobs resulting in 
an efficient labor market).  
15
 See infra Section I.B for a discussion of whether increased judicial acceptance of exceptions to the at-will rule 
signals the end of the doctrine as the default rule.  
16





 In addition to the argument that the doctrine provides inadequate 
job security, it is also argued that the doctrine creates a presumption of at-will status that is at 
odds with the parties‟ true intent.
18
 Despite those criticisms, the doctrine survives as the default 
rule in 49 out of 50 American States.
19
 While the criticisms of the employment-at-will doctrine 
are not without merit, the doctrine has endured as the default rule because courts and legislatures 
alike find that its justifications outweigh its criticisms.   
B. Increasing Limitations and the Resulting Uncertainty 
 
 Modern jurisprudence has tempered the strict interpretation of the employment-at-will 
doctrine. Legislatures and courts are imposing an increasing number of exceptions that limit 
some of the harsher applications of the doctrine. For example, the employment-at-will rule was 
initially eroded by state and federal statutes that prohibited an employer from terminating an 
employee in violation of collective bargaining agreements, most of which impose a just-cause 
requirement for terminations.
20
  Since then, anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act,
21
 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
22
 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act
23
 have further limited employers‟ discretion in terminating employees. A host of 
other state and federal statutes prohibit terminations for activities such as serving on a jury, 
                                                          
17
  Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward A New Foundation for Employment Termination Law, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 123 (2006). See also Massingale, supra note 3, at 201. (“The United States 
worker, like those in other civilized nations, has a strong interest in employment security and should reasonably be 
able to expect continued employment where the worker does the job expected within legal, moral, and ethical limits. 
Society is better served when job security for America‟s work force is not linked to unreasonable employer 
expectations.”). 
18
 Estreicher, supra note 3 at 39.  
19
 See supra note 10.  
20
 Massingale, supra note 3, at 190 (citing Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to 
―Just Cause Protection Under Title VII,‖ 2 IND. REL. L.J. 519, 522 (1978)).  
21
 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.  
22
 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. 
23
 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq.  
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 The judiciary has followed a parallel path in narrowing the applicability of the 
employment-at-will rule by awarding relief under various common law causes of action. 
Tortious interference claims are one example of a tort claim that chips away at the at-will 
employment rule.
25
 Wrongful discharge suits provide yet another common law limit on an 
employer‟s traditionally unlimited power to terminate an employee.  Wrongful discharge suits 
are typically based on either tort or contract theories of recovery.  Wrongful termination suits 
sounding in tort are traditionally grounded on a violation of public policy of some sort.
26
 Some 
common examples include: whistleblower protection;
27
 performance of public obligations;
28
 and 
refusal to commit a crime.
29
 
Wrongful discharge claims based on contract theories of recovery are independent of 
public policy considerations.
30
  Under this heading, one approach that courts take to limit the 
reasons for which an employer can terminate an employee is to show greater receptiveness in 
                                                          
24
 Massingale, supra note 3, at 191(citing Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge, 26 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 449, 456 (1985); Jury System Improvement Act of 1978; Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 
1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 1875; Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651). 
25
 See, e.g., Cavico, supra note 13, at 503; Alex B. Long, Tortious Interference with Business Relations: ―The Other 
White Meat‖ of Employment Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 863, 914 (2000) (hereinafter, “White Meat”) (stating that 
tortious interference claims “represent a significant loophole in the employment-at-will context.”); Long, 
Disconnect, supra note 8, at 493 (“[T]he insertion of interference claims into the workplace tends to undermine the 
employment at-will default rule.”); Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed 
Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‟Y J 93, 103-04 
(2009) (noting that tortious interference with economic advantage claims against chief executive officers provide an 
employee with a cause of action where one against the employer may not be cognizable). 
26
 Massingale, supra note 3, at 191 (citing Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124 (1981)).  
27
 See Estreicher, supra note 3, at 209-15 (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171 (1974); Palmateer, 
85 Ill.2d 124 (1981)). 
28
 See Estreicher, supra note 3, at 188-90 (citing Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 (1975)). 
29
 Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65 (1995). 
30
 Massingale, supra note 3, at 195. 
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finding express promises of job security.
31
  But perhaps the more prevalent approach utilized to 
challenge an allegedly improper termination is the implied contract theory.
32
  Other contract-
based doctrines that are sometimes successful in challenging employment terminations are 
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing
33
 and promissory estoppel.
34
   
The erosion of the employment-at-will rule has led some scholars to question whether the 
doctrine truly remains the default rule in American jurisprudence.
35
 Members of the American 
Law Institute (ALI) Working Group on the proposed Restatement of Employment Law have 
expressly questioned the ALI‟s conclusion that employment-at-will
36
 remains the default.
37
  
They offer several reasons for their conclusion. One is a uniquely high number of concurring and 
dissenting opinions, which shows that the law in this area is in considerable flux.
38
 Additionally, 
there is wide diversion among various American jurisdictions regarding application of the 
various exceptions to the at-will rule.
39
  Moreover, some appellate courts have gone so far as to 
                                                          
31
 Estreicher, supra note 3, at 45. 
32
 Massingale, supra note 3 at 195 (noting that implied contracts may be found in an employee handbook, policy 
manual, memorandum or an employer‟s oral statements). 
33
 Id. at 198 (stating that some jurisdictions hold that contracting parties have an implied duty to exercise good faith 
and fair dealing and the failure to do so constitutes bad faith, potentially giving rise to tort damages). 
34
 Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100 (1985).  
35
 The increased application of exceptions to the at-will rule has also led to uncertainty regarding what sort of 
terminations will be considered wrongful by a court. Massingale, supra note 3, at 187.  
36
 Specifically, the ALI states the rule as follows: 
Unless an agreement, statute or other law or public policy limits the right to terminate, either party 
may terminate an employment relationship with or without cause.  
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 2.01 (Default Rule of At-Will Employment Relationship) (Council Draft 
No. 3, 2008).  
37
 Finkin, supra note 25.  
38
 Id. at 95.  
39
 Id. at 97.  As evidence for this proposition, the authors cite Murphy v. American Home Products, 58 N.Y.2d 293 
(N.Y. 1983). They explain: 
In Murphy, a long-time employee was fired in retaliation for truthfully whistle-blowing and was 
discharged in an abusive manner. Some states, notably California, would provide Murphy relief 
under an “implied in fact” theory of contract, providing good cause job security, given the length 
of his employment. Some states, notably Alaska, would provide an employee like Murphy relief 
under a covenant of good faith and fair dealing rubric. Some states – probably the majority of 
states – would provide Murphy relief under a public policy rubric for his truthful whistle-blowing 
7 
 
hold that a jury instruction stating that an employer can fire an employee for any reason 
constitutes reversible error.
40
   
C. Extending the Erosion: From Protecting Job Security to Embracing Employee Mobility  
 Whether or not the exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine truly swallow the rule 
is still up for debate.  What is clear, however, is that courts are limiting an employer‟s 
traditionally unlimited power under the employment-at-will doctrine.
41
 Indeed, “[t]he once 
impenetrable fortress of at-will employment is no longer a reality.”
42
 This recent judicial trend is 
markedly pro-employee as the decrease in employer power signifies an increase in employee 
protection. This supports the argument for a narrow standard of liability in tortious interference 
with employment relationship claims. Just as employers are subject to increasing restrictions for 
the reasons they can terminate an employee, courts should also subject them to a corollary 
restriction that limits their ability to curb their employees‟ future employment opportunities.   
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIMS  
A. Generally  
Tortious interference claims are a “curious blend” of negligent and intentional torts
43
 and 




 There are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
activity. Still others would provide Murphy with relief for the abusive and undignified way that he 
was publicly treated as a criminal and his possessions were dumped out when he came to retrieve 
them, (notably Iowa, Texas, Oregon, and Arkansas). In other instances and in other states, 
promissory estoppel rules provide employees with cushions against the unjust harshness of the 
strict application of the at-will rule. 
Id. at 98 (internal citations omitted). 
40
 Id. at 103 (internal citations omitted).  
41
 See, e.g, Massingale, supra note 3, at 187 (noting that the employment-at-will doctrine is undergoing serious 
erosion); Long, Disconnect, supra note 8, 520 (2001) (noting that scholars agree that modern employment law 
lessened the unfairness of the pure notion of the employment-at-will).  
42
 Massingale, supra note 3, at 204. 
43
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 871 (citing International Union, United Mine Workers v. Covenant Coal 
Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)).  
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two types of tortious interference claims: (1) tortious interference with contract; and (2) tortious 
interference with prospective contractual relations.
46
  The most common approach for analyzing 
the interference torts comes from the Restatement.
47
  
B. Tortious Interference with Contract  
 
The Restatement § 766 outlines the tort of interference with contract as follows: 
One who intentionally and improperly
48
 interferes with the performance of a 
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by 
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is 
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from 




As the text makes clear, the existence and breach of a valid contract which gives the 
plaintiff legal rights
50
 is a prerequisite to the interference with contract tort.
51
  Because the parties 
formalized their agreement, the law justifiably affords the relationship greater protection.
52
  
Consequently, the Restatement does not recognize competition as a defense to tortious 
interference with contract claims.
53
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
44
 See Rebecca Bernhard, Note, The Three Faces of Eve: Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment-At-Will 
Setting, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1541 (2002).  
45
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 871 (citing Gary D. Wexler, Comment, Intentional Interference with 
Contract: Market Efficient and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN L. REV. 279, 282 (1994)).  
46
 See Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 868.  
47
 Id.  
48
 What constitutes “improper” interference and which party has the burden to prove the interference was improper 
has been the subject of considerable confusion among courts. Indeed, “[a]s worded, the burden would appear to be 
on the plaintiff to establish that the interference was improper as part of her prima facie case. However, the authors 
[of the Restatement] chose to hedge on this issue by stating that a plaintiff is „well advised‟ to plead that the 
interference is improper, but noting that the matter may also be held to be one of defense.” Id. (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts 767 cmt b. (1977)).   
49
 Restatement (Second) of Torts 766 (1977).   
50
 The presence of a definite contract is also important as it defines the plaintiff‟s interests and therefore the 




 See Thomas J. Collin et al., Ohio Tortious Interference Law and the Role of Privilege and Competition, 18 
DAYTON L. REV. 635, 637 (1993) (noting that interference with a formal contract is more likely to be improper than 
is interference with a less formalized business relationship).  
53
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 872 (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts 768(2) (1977)).  
9 
 




 The elements of a tortious interference with prospective contractual relations claim are 
similar to the tort of interference with contract.  As one would guess, the major difference is that 
the prerequisite of an existing contract is exchanged for a prospective contractual relation or 
business expectancy,
55
 which encompasses the prospect of obtaining or maintaining employees.
56
  
The Restatement defines the tort as: 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another‟s prospective 
contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other 
for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether 
the interference consists of 
 
 (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the 
prospective relation or  
 




 Some jurisdictions choose not to follow the Restatement‟s formulation, instead requiring 
that a plaintiff prove: “(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business 
expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor; (3) 
intentional interference inducing or causing a breach of termination of the relationship or 
expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted.”
58
 After the plaintiff establishes that prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
                                                          
54
 Tortious interference with prospective contractual relations claims are also commonly referred to tortious 
interference with expectancy or tortious interference with business relations claims.  
55
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 868. 
56
 Cavico, supra note 13, at 507 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 766B (1979)).  
57
 Restatement (Second) of Torts 768B (1977).  
58
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 869 (citing Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102-03 (Va. 1985); Tiernan v. 
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 591-92 (W.Va., 1998)).  
10 
 




The main criticism of the latter approach is particularly relevant to the ultimate analytical 
framework this Note proposes.  One author cogently described that criticism as requiring “too 
little of the plaintiff, because the major issue in the controversy – justification for the defendant‟s 
conduct – is left to be resolved on the affirmative defense of privilege.”
60
  On the other hand, 
most courts adopting the Restatement put the “very significant burden” on the plaintiff to show 
the interference was improper or unjustified.
61
 Regardless of the criticisms, a privilege for fair 




D. Tortious Interference with At-Will Employment Relationships: Recommended Approach 
 
 Most jurisdictions hold that an aggrieved party can bring a tortious interference claim 
with respect to an at-will contract.
63
 Which, then, of the above standards should such a claim be 
governed under? This Note argues that tortious interference with employment relationship claims 
should be governed under the framework for tortious interference with prospective contractual 
relations claims.   
 Jurisdictions take a variety of approaches when applying tortious interference claims to 
at-will relationships.  A minority of jurisdictions hold that at-will contracts cannot give rise to 
                                                          
59
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 869 (citing Chaves, 335 S.E.2d at 103). See also Cavico, supra note 13, at 
509 (noting that a greater freedom to compete is recognized in at-will contracts).  
60
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 869 (citing Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah, 
1982). See also Gary Myers, The Differing Efficiency and Competition and Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 
77 MINN L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1993) (arguing the better approach is to put the burden of demonstrating impropriety 
on the plaintiff).  
61
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 870 (citing King v. Sioux City Radiological Group, 985 F.Supp. 869, 881-82 
(N.D.Iowa 1997) (applying Iowa law); Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 303.  
62
 Long, White Meat, supra note 25, at 872 
63
 Cavico, supra note 13, at 513. 
11 
 
tortious interference claims at all.
64
  Some jurisdictions treat it as tortious interference with a 
business expectancy or prospective contractual relationship.
65
 Even those jurisdictions that 
classify interference torts in at-will situations as one with contract narrow the circumstances 
under which the defendant is liable,
66
 making the claim functionally similar to the interference 
with expectancy tort. Still others fail to distinguish between the two claims.
67
 Even the 
Restatement seems confused on the matter.  In the very same comment where it states that at-will 
relationships are “valid and subsisting” contracts, it goes on to state:  
One‟s interest in a contract terminable at will is primarily an interest in future 
relations between the parties, and he has no legal assurance of them. For this 
reason, an interference with this interest is closely analogous to interference with 
prospective contractual relations. If the defendant was a competitor regarding the 





 The sounder approach is to permit tortious interference claims in at-will relationships but 
provide a narrow scope of liability.
69
 Accordingly, this Note takes the position that tortious 
interference claims in the at-will context should be governed under the prospective contractual 
relations scheme.  While it is technically true that the employee had a contract with his previous 
employer, that contract was an at-will one. At-will contracts are essentially prospective 
                                                          
64
 Id. at 508-09 (citing Stanton v. Tulane Univ. of Louisiana, 777 So.2d 1242, 1252 (La. App. 2001); McManus v. 
MCI Comm. Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 957 (D.C. 2000); GAB Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Serv., Inc., 
99 Cal. Rptr.2d 665, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).  
65
 Id. at 513.  
66
 Id. at 511-13 (noting that those jurisdictions take the at-will nature of the relationship into account when 
determining what interference actions are proper or improper, may use the at-will nature of the contract to place the 
burden of proving impropriety on the plaintiff and take it into account when determining the extent of the plaintiff‟s 
damages)(citing cases). 
67
 See, e.g., Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. Proserv, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law) 
(Posner, J.) (noting that inducing the termination of an at-will contract is actionable under Illinois law, either as 
interference with prospective economic advantage or as interference with the contract at will itself, and that 
“[n]othing turns on the difference in characterization.”). 
68
 Restatement (Second) of Torts 766, cmt. g (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  
69
 Tortious interference claims are often criticized for their adverse impact on competition and efficiency. Long, 
White Meat, supra note 25, at 872 (citing Myers, supra note 60, at 1100). A narrow standard of liability helps to 
alleviate those ill-effects. See Cavico, supra note 13, at 566 (noting that a broad conception of the interference torts, 
especially prospective contractual relations, can hinder legitimate competition).  
12 
 
contractual relations as the parties have specifically chosen to enter an agreement that lacks the 
definiteness present in, for example, a contract containing temporal or just-cause guarantees.  
The absence of a temporal promise or just-cause restriction engenders different expectations 
among the parties than where an employer and employee bargain for a certain, specified term. 
 For example, picture the situation where a professional sports franchise signs an 
experienced athlete to a four year contract in the hopes that the player can provide supplemental 
scoring and veteran leadership. In that situation, the franchise is justified in taking steps to 
structure their game-day preparation around the fact that, in the absence of injury, they will have 
a veteran player to provide leadership and (hopefully) put points on the board for the next four 
years. Similarly, knowing that he will most likely be with that franchise for the next four years, 
the veteran makes team-specific investments in order to fulfill his contractual obligations.  He 
takes the time to learn a new offensive and defensive scheme, develop a comfort level with his 
new coaches and teammates and may even change his style of play in order to mesh with his new 
team.  
 That is not true where the franchise signs the veteran on an at-will basis.  In that situation, 
all would agree the team would be ill-advised to structure a long-term plan that relies heavily on 
the veteran. Indeed, if the veteran may only be on the team for a short period of time, it is likely 
the team will not even expose the veteran to its entire playbook. Similarly, the veteran is unlikely 
to make valuable team-specific investments for the franchise that offered him no guarantee of 
sustained employment. 
 That example, while somewhat crude, is meant to illustrate the differences in the 
contacting parties‟ expectations in an at-will versus definite contract and how parties justifiably 
rely on them. In the at-will context, the parties can only expect the relationship to continue into 
13 
 
the future.  The employer expects the employee to show up for work on Monday, but there is no 
guarantee she will.  And the employee expects that when she shows up for work on Monday, her 
job will be waiting for her, but there is no promise that it will. Therefore, tortious interference 
with at-will employment relationship is properly analyzed under the framework governing 
tortious interference with prospective contractor relations.  
III. NON-COMPETE COVENANTS
70
   
 
 While there is little empirical data on the use of non-compete clauses, all indications are 
that restrictive covenants are becoming increasingly common in modern employment 
relationships,
71
 including at-will employment.
72
  Non-compete covenants
73
 restrict an employee 
from competing with his former employer within a specific geographic region for a certain 
period of time
74
 after the employment relationship ends.
75
  Employers utilize noncompetition 
agreements in order to prevent competitors and former employees from appropriating proprietary 
business information.
76
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 This Note addresses only the situation where the non-compete covenant was signed at the same time that the 
employment relationship began. 
71
 Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation From Employee 
Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 287, 289 (2006) 
(noting that the “single formal attempt to quantify the volume of noncompetes and their use is now over fifteen years 
old.”) (citing Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. 
CORP. L. 483 (1990)). See also Gerald T. Laurie, David A. Harbeck, Balancing Business Protection with Freedom 
to Work: A Review of Noncompete Agreements in Minnesota, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 107, 108 (1997).  
72
 Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing 
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 738-39 (2002) (noting the increased use of restrictive covenants in the 
employment-at-will context). 
73
 In order to avoid repetition, this Note refers to non-compete covenants, noncompetition agreements, covenants not 
to compete and restrictive covenants interchangeably.   
74
 “Given the explosive growth of the Internet and the fast pace of business today, courts are likely to examine the 
duration of noncompetition agreements more closely. The traditional advice that noncompetition agreements of one 
to two years duration are „reasonable,‟ may need to be reexamined to in particular industries and businesses.” 
Laurence H. Reece, III, Legal Analysis: Employee Noncompetition Agreements: Four Recurring Issues, 46 BOSTON 
BAR J. 10, 11(March/April 2002). 
75
 Whitmore, supra note 71, at 484. 
76
 T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 3 (2005). When 
determining the enforceability of non-compete clauses, courts consider the following factors: the length of the 
temporal restriction; the breadth of the geographic restriction; the overall hardship to the parties; the employee‟s 
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Noncompetition agreements in the employment relationship are carefully scrutinized by 
courts and often construed against the employer.
77
 One author describes the competing policy 
concerns underlying the judicial scrutiny: 
The public policy benefits derived by enforcing these covenants are the protection 
of proprietary interests, facilitation of investment in research, and the 
encouragement of development in human capital (personnel). The public policy 
costs of enforcing restrictive covenants include the potential of limiting 
competition, impeding the dissemination of information, and retarding the 
economic mobility of employees. These conflicting concerns have been the 





A. Inconsistency with Employment-at-Will  
 
 Because non-compete covenants restrain trade, courts are rightfully careful when 
scrutinizing their validity. In fact, by restraining trade and competition, noncompetition 
agreements are inconsistent with the very nature of at-will relationships, which promote 
competition.
79
 Indeed, one author stated: 
Every time a noncompetition clause is litigated, the court is forced to grapple with 
two conflicting policies. The first policy is the freedom to contract. . . . In the 
noncompetition clause setting, strict adherence to this doctrine would result in 
complete enforcement of all noncompetition clauses. The second doctrine . . . is 
the doctrine against contractual restraints of trade. This doctrine holds that parties 
may not make contracts which overly restrict the fundamental right to practice a 
trade. . . .Strict adherence to this doctrine, then, would result in judicial rejection 
of all noncompetition clauses. Obviously, these two fundamental principles of 
contract law are in direct conflict.
80
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
level of access to confidential information; the employee‟s relationship with the employer‟s customers; the 
employee‟s occupation; and the public interest. Whitmore, supra note 71, at 489-90 (citing D. Aspelund & C. 
Eriksen, Employee Noncompetition Law § 1.01, at 6-1 to 6-2 (1988); A. Valiulis, Covenants Not to Compete: 
Forms Tactics, and the Law ix 183-84 (1985)). 
77
 Reece, supra note 74, at 10.  
78
 Anenson, supra note 76, at 503. See also Stone, supra note 72, at 723 (noting the “the murky intertwine of 
conflicting interests” underlying the determination of whether to enforce non-compete clauses signed at the 
commencement of employment as: “employee interest in job mobility; employer interest in protecting their business 
secrets; society‟s interest in a free and competitive labor market; and judicial interest in enforcing contracts.”). 
79
 See supra Section I.B. See also Stone, supra note 72, at 742 (“Restrictive covenants involving at-will employees 
are particularly problematic and sometimes receive additional scrutiny.”).  
80




This Note concedes that the law should permit an employer to extract a non-compete 
clause from at-will employees, but maintains the clause should have limited enforceability 
because the policy against contractual restraints of trade trumps the freedom of contract 
argument under these circumstances.  The basis for this argument lies with the realities of the 
„new workplace in the new economy‟
81
 and a fundamental disagreement with the mistaken 
assumption that a noncompetition agreement in the at-will employment context should occupy 
the same legal footing as other bargained-for contracts.  
 The modern workplace is a stark departure from the model that was in place during 
much of the previous century.
82
 Indeed, “[t]he secure, long-term employment relationships 
associated with an earlier era are largely obsolete today, having been replaced with a variety of 
short-term employment arrangements . . . . From the perspective of employees, job tenure is in 
decline and job hopping is commonplace.”
83
  Modern employees often experience many lateral 
moves between and within companies throughout the course of their careers.
84
  Gone are the 
days where a newly hired employee could realistically believe that if she performed adequately 
and was loyal to her employer, she would be compensated with a lifetime job and steady pay.
85
  
Back then, such an employee “could safely invest in acquiring firm-specific skills and rely on the 
company to manage his or her career expectations.”
86
 Nowadays, rather, “[t]he new 
understanding between employers and employees is that, rather than grooming employees for 
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 Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of 
Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1198 - 1203 (2001) (explaining 
how the modern workplace departs from prior models of employment relationships). 
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 Id. at 1198. 
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 Id.  
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 Id. at 1200. 
85





internal promotion, employers will offer employees work experience that will keep them 
marketable to other employers in the event that they are terminated.”
87
  
The realities of the modern workplace mandate a narrow standard of liability in tortious 
interference claims between employers.  If the nature of modern employment relationship 
envisions (indeed, requires) a more mobile employee, it would be illogical for the law to cast a 
blind eye to that reality by imposing a broad standard of liability under these circumstances. A 
broad liability framework ignores that “the employer‟s promise of long-term employment has 
been replaced by a promise of employability, and the new understanding is that the employee‟s 
lifelong relationship will be with the market rather than the company.”
88
 An employer should not 
be subjected to the possibility for potentially substantial monetary liability for participating in the 
market.  
Moreover, in the at-will employment context, non-compete covenants are not truly 
bargained-for as the employer and employee possess drastically different bargaining power, with 
the employer enjoying the upper hand.
89
  In fact, for most employees, signing a covenant not to 
compete is usually a precondition to employment.
90
 “Even the balance between the mutual right 
of the employer and the employee to terminate is tipped in favor of employer because in the in 
the real world of industrial relations, employees seldom quit voluntarily.”
91
 The current job 
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 Id. at 1202. 
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 Massingale, supra note 3, at 200 (noting the considerable disparity between the employer and employee‟s 
bargaining position); Laurie, supra note 71, at 110 (noting that employees traditionally have little power with regard 
to non-compete agreements).  
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 Laurie, supra note 71, at 110. 
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 Massingale, supra note 3, at 200 (citing Theodore St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform 
Heads Towards Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67-68 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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market makes that difference even clearer as employees are “prone to sign any document placed 
before them” in order to obtain employment.
92
  
Furthermore, because the non-compete clause is not a salient feature of her employment 
contract, an employee‟s assent to such a restrictive covenant should not be given full legal force. 
In fact, because of the lack of a truly negotiated contract, employment contracts (for most 
employees) are similar to standard form contracts in the everyday consumer context. While some 
terms, such as salary, are more likely to be negotiated on an individual basis (for a certain 
category of employees), a boilerplate contract is likely to be the norm. In such a situation the 
employment contract resembles a contract by adhesion as the employer offers the contract – the 
salary, the benefits and the non-compete clause – on a take it or leave it basis.
93
  Courts, 
however, have traditionally enforced such contracts “whether or not that party approves of the 
terms provided, understands those terms, has read them, or even has the vaguest idea what the 
terms might be about.”
94
 While that may the common approach, it is not necessarily the wisest or 
most efficient one.
 95
  Because employees are only boundedly rational, they only consider certain 
attributes of an employment offer when deciding to accept an offer – ignoring all others.
96
 
Consider the employee who receives an offer of employment that includes many terms 
and conditions of her future employment such as salary, job description, medical benefits, 
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 See Theodore St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 
789 (2008) (noting that pre-dispute arbitration agreements signed at the commencement of employment are less fair 
to the employee than post-dispute arbitration agreements). 
93
 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1203, 1204 (2003). See also Kate O‟Neill, ―Should I Stay or Should I Go?‖ – Covenants Not to Compete in a Down 
Economy: A proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 83, 93 (2010) 
(noting that employee assent to employment contracts are adhesive if required to obtain or retain employment-at-
will).  
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 Korobkin, supra note 93, at 1204. 
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 See Korobkin, supra note 93. While Korobkin‟s article applies to shoppers and consumers, most employees are in 
an analogous situation.  
96
 Id. at 1206.  
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retirement benefits, fringe benefits and a noncompetition agreement. The restrictive covenant 
gets lost in the mix.  The employee is focused on the short term and, upon just getting hired, is 
not thinking about what will happen if the employment relationship ends.  And, as a result, the 
noncompetition clause is not a salient
97
 term to the employee. 
A contract term that is actually considered by an employee is considered a salient term.
98
  
Conversely, non-salient terms are those terms that the employee does not focus on.
99
  In order to 
gain salience, a contract term must capture the employee‟s limited attention span.
100
  With the 
immediate impact accompanying other terms, it is not surprising that the non-compete covenant 
fails to catch the employee‟s attention. When an employment relationship has just begun, 
employees do not think about how it will end and how a non-compete covenant could impact 
their future employment prospects. Rather, the employee‟s chief concerns are how much money 
she will make and what benefits she is entitled to.  
Bounded rationality causes inefficiency in contracts.
101
  In order to reduce that 
inefficiency, Korobkin offers the following:  
Courts‟ initial step should be an analysis of whether a challenged contract term is 
salient to a significant number of buyers. When a contract term is salient to 
purchasers, the market can be trusted to provide an efficient version of the 
term    . . . . When a contract term is non-salient to most purchasers, the market 
check on seller overreaching is absent, and courts should be suspicious of the 
resulting term. Put slightly differently, whenever a term in a form contract is non-
salient to most purchasers, those purchasers are incompetent to protect their 
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Korobkin‟s statement applies with equal force to employees who are unable to negotiate the 
terms of their employment contract.  
Given the judicial scrutiny of non-compete covenants, it seems that courts already agree 
with Korobkin that a decision-maker should be suspicious of non-salient contractual terms.  
Because the non-compete clause is not salient to the employee, the employer has an incentive to 
provide a socially inefficient one. Courts should curb employer opportunism and promote 
efficiency and society‟s interest in free competition by continuing to cast a skeptical eye on non-
compete clauses in the at-will employment context. This supports a narrow standard of liability 
in the tortious interference because a narrow standard of liability curbs a different sort of 
employer opportunism – seeking financial windfalls (via tort damages) from their competitors 
for engaging in fair competition.  
That is not to say that an employer lacks a legitimate interest that it should be able to 
protect by extracting a non-compete clause.  Indeed, trade secrets
103
, customer lists, confidential 
information and goodwill are all examples of proprietary information that successful businesses 
must protect. That is not to mention that, where an employee holds a key position within a 
company, a sudden and unexpected departure can cause considerable hardship on the 
employer.
104
  Indeed, some employers believe their employee‟s knowledge is a major asset and a 
primary source of competitive advantage.
105
 This Note disputes neither the validity of those 
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protectable interests nor the hardship an employer endures through the loss of a meaningful 
employee.  What this Note does argue, however, is that the law should not allow the employer to 
have his cake and eat it too – to not only provide an employee with little to no job security, 
leaving him susceptible to termination at almost any time for almost any reason, but also restrict 
that employee‟s opportunities once the employment terminates.  As stated by one author: 
If an at-will employee is fired without cause, she has no redress for her unjust 
dismissal; yet, if there is a [restrictive] covenant in effect, she can be prevented 
from performing another job. Because courts usually enforce noncompete 
covenants with injunctions, an at-will employee who has been fired unfairly can 
be barred from accepting all subsequent employment in the type of work that she 
is best able to perform. That is, an employee subject to a restrictive covenant, who 
is fired unfairly, is left without a job and is unable to take another one in her 




As discussed below, the law should require the employer to take additional measures to 
protect his proprietary information beyond routine insertion of a non-compete covenant in its 
employment contracts. Normative concerns about an at-will employee‟s ability to bargain 
effectively and the impact of noncompetition agreements on those employees‟ economic 
freedom mandate that restrictive covenants are only enforceable to protect discrete business 
interests.
107
  Such a scheme protects employee mobility, yet still permits employers to protect 
their proprietary information without imposing significant costs on them.  
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 Id. at 742 (internal citations omitted). Admittedly, this Note does not address the situation where the employee 
was fired unfairly. While the argument for a narrow standard of liability may be most strong in that context, the 
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B. Application to Tortious Interference Claims: Taking Issue with the Restatement 
By adding a contractual layer to an expectancy relationship, the presence of the non-
compete covenant complicates formulating an appropriate liability framework.
108
 Without the 
restrictive covenant, the employer has only an expectancy that the employee will show up for 
work and thus only an interest in prospective contractual relations. But once the employer 
extracts the noncompetition agreement, it has the added definitive expectation that the employee 
will not compete against it.  
Though it is less than clear, the Restatement appears to treat at-will contracts as 
prospective contractual relations, which embraces fair competition.
109
 The Restatement states, 
however, that there is an exception to its free competition rule in the at-will context if a valid 
non-compete covenant is connected to the at-will agreement.
110
  In that situation, “even though a 
competitor in the same business may be justified in inducing the at-will employee to quit his or 
her job, the competitor would not be excused from hiring that employee if to do so would mean a 
contravention of the non-competition covenant.”
111
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 Indeed, the Restatement notes that an exception to its at-will free competition rule arises if there is a valid non-
compete covenant. Cavico, supra note 13, at 539-40 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 768(1), cmt. i.).  
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 Cavico, supra note 13, at 513-14; Restatement (Second) of Torts 768(1). 
110
 Cavico, supra note 13, at 539. 
111
 Id. at 539-40 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 768(1), cmt i). Specifically, the Restatement states: 
i. Contracts terminable at will. The rule stated in Subsection (1) that competition may be an 
interference that is not improper also applies to existing contracts that are terminable at will. If the 
third person is free to terminate his contractual relation with the plaintiff when he chooses, there is 
still a subsisting contract relation; but any interference with it that induces its termination is 
primarily an interference with the future relation between the parties, and the plaintiff has no legal 
assurance of them. As for the future hopes he has no legal right but only an expectancy; and when 
the contract is terminated by the choice of the third person there is no breach of it. The competitor 
is therefore free, for his own competitive advantage, to obtain the future benefits for himself by 
causing the termination. Thus he may offer better contract terms, as by offering an employee of 
the plaintiff more money to work for him or by offering a seller higher prices for goods, and he 
may make use of persuasion or other suitable means, all without liability. 
 
An employment contract, however, may be only partially terminable at will. Thus it may leave the 
employment at the employee's option but provide that he is under a continuing obligation not to 
engage in competition with his former employer. Under these circumstances a defendant engaged 
22 
 
 This Note argues that the Restatement‟s approach is flawed because it mistakenly looks 
only at the presence of the non-compete clause and ignores the defining quality of the 
employment relationship – at-will employment. The employer offered at-will employment.  The 
employee accepted. That at-will label is the lynchpin of their relationship and must guide the 
court‟s analysis. Moreover, as discussed above, the noncompetition clause in the at-will context 
does not occupy the same legal footing as other bargained-for contracts. Therefore, imposing the 
stricter tortious interference with contract framework on an expectancy relationship with only a 
contractual gloss is improper.
112
 Considering the parties‟ relationship as a whole, it becomes 




IV. PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
A. Framing the Issue  
 
 This Note argues that tortious interference claims with at-will employment relationships 
are properly characterized as tortious interference with expectancy claims.  The presence of a 
valid non-compete agreement complicates the issue, however, by adding a contractual layer to an 
otherwise expectancy relationship.  How, then, should the law treat this situation?  In order to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in the same business might induce the employee to quit his job, but he would not be justified in 
engaging the employee to work for him in an activity that would mean violation of the contract not 
to compete. 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 768 cmt. i.  
112
 There is also the argument that, as an employer, the plaintiff would benefit from a less strict standard of liability. 
A strict standard of liability could chill good employees from working for an employer on an at-will basis if the 
employer insists on a non-compete clause.  
113
 “When a contract is terminable at will there is only an expectancy that the relationship will continue.” Cavico, 
supra note 13, at 555 (citing Greenberg v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc., 629 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).  In fact, as mentioned above, some courts refuse to even allow a tortious interference claim in 
the at-will context because they are “concerned that a too expansive application of the interference tort to at-will 
employment will hinder the legitimate interests of employees in seeking employment and advancing their 
careers     . . . .” Id. at 509 (citing GAB Bus Serv., Inc v. Lindsey & Netso Claim Serv., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 665, 
677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).  
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determine a proper analytical framework, the issue must first be framed; that is, what exactly is 
the employee‟s new employer (the defendant) interfering with?  This Note takes the position that 
the defendant interferes with the employment relationship as a whole, not simply the non-
compete covenant. The relationship includes a non-compete covenant to be sure, but the defining 
characteristic of the relationship is that it is terminable at-will.  
Assuming that the noncompetition agreement is valid, the employer‟s interest in the 
relationship warrants increased protection. The overarching nature of the relationship, however, 
remains at-will.  For that reason, this Note argues that the standard of liability should blend 
together the flexibility of tortious interference with prospective contractual relations theory and 
some protections of tortious interference with contract framework. As one court stated while 
declining to recognize an employer‟s right to sue for interference in the at-will employment 
context: 
Expanding the tort to include employer claims could have the unintended 
consequence of chilling employment opportunities: Faced with the likely prospect 
of litigation, employers may reasonably conclude that hiring a competitor‟s 




This Note‟s proposed framework seeks to avoid that result.  
B. Blended Liability: A Proposed Framework 
 
 Any framework that is proposed to analyze liability in an expectancy relationship with a 
contractual gloss should incorporate aspects of both claims‟ liability schemes into its framework. 
Because the lynchpin of the employment relationship is at-will, the policies embodied in 
prospective contractual relations claims must take precedence. The framework, however, must 
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 Cavico, supra note 13, at 567 (citing GAB Bus. Serv., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 677). 
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still respect the contractual layer that the parties added to the relationship via the non-compete 
covenant.
115
 This Note proposes a three-step analytical framework.
116
  
1. The Plaintiff‟s Prima Facie Case  
 First, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case.  That requires proof of the following 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the existence of an employment relationship; 
(2) the defendant‟s knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant‟s interference with the 
employment relationship for an improper purpose; and (4) the interference was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff‟s harm.  If the plaintiff meets this burden, the full spectrum of tort damages 
is available.  
 As an initial matter, since tortious interference claims are intentional torts, actual 
knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge, is required for the second element.
117
 The most 
difficult element for the plaintiff to prove is that the defendant‟s interference was improper. 
Section 767 of the Restatement lists the following factors to consider in analyzing whether a 
defendant‟s interference is improper: 
 (a) the nature of the actor‟s conduct
118
;  
 (b) the actor‟s motive;  
 (c) the interests of the other with which the actor‟s conduct interferes; 
 (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor;  
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 Cavico, supra note 13, at 506 (citing Restatement (Second of Torts 768B cmt. c. (1979)) (“[A]s the Restatement 
indicates, „the added element of a definite contract may be a basis for greater protection.‟”). But see supra Section 
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 (e) the societal interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the 
contractual interest of the other;   
 (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor‟s conduct to the interference; and  
 (g) the relations between the parties.
119
 
 When analyzing the impropriety element, the court should also consider the accepted 
ethical standards as well as industry practice to determine whether the defendant‟s conduct was 
“sanctioned by the rules of the game.”
120
  Additionally, while malice may bear on the issue of 
liability or punitive damages, personal ill will, spite or hatred on the part of the interferor is not 
an essential element of the cause of action.
121
   
 This Note places the burden of proving that the purpose behind the defendant‟s 
interference was improper on the plaintiff, rather than requiring that the defendant prove it was 
proper as part of an affirmative defense. This is consistent with the argument that tortious 
interference claims in the at-will employment context should impose liability in only a narrow 
set of circumstances. By setting a higher bar for proving a prima facie case, the proposed 
framework imposes a burden on the plaintiff that will help weed out meritless claims while 
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 While there is a valid argument that this burden should be on the defendant since it is the party with the best 
access to the information, it is inconsistent with this Note‟s argument for a narrow standard of liability. Placing this 
burden on the defendant makes proof of a prima facie case (and the availability of tort damages) much easier, while 




2. The Defendant‟s Fair Competition Affirmative Defense  
 After the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the defendant possesses a “fair competition” 
affirmative defense which, if proved, can limit the plaintiff‟s damage award.  The affirmative 
defense involves an analysis of three factors: (1) the extent of the at-will nature of the 
employment relationship; (2) the propriety of the new employer‟s method of interference (i.e. the 
actor does not employ wrongful means); and (3) evidence that the interference was for purely 
competitive purposes and with an intent to further his own business.  If the defendant carries this 
burden, punitive damages are unavailable.  
In practice, whether, and to what extent, an employee is „at-will‟ is not always clear.  For 
example, some employees may be employed at-will yet still have some implied job protections, 
such as a mandatory written warning and re-training period prior to termination.  For that reason, 
this Note views the „nature‟ of at-will employment relationships as falling on a spectrum.  
Employees falling at one end of the spectrum are truly employed at-will and enjoy no implied 
job protections whatsoever.  Employees at the other extreme, while having no express temporal 
or just-cause guarantees, are subject to many implied job protections.  Most employees would 
seem to fall somewhere between these two extremes.  
Determining where the employee at issue falls on this spectrum is the focus of the first 
factor of the affirmative defense.  The closer the employee is to the first extreme (that is, no 
implied job protections), the more competition is permitted and thus the more likely the 
defendant is to succeed on his affirmative defense. The opposite is true at the other extreme 
where the employer offers his employee meaningful implied job protections. In that situation, the 
employee is acting more opportunistically by terminating the relationship, making the imposition 
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of a non-compete clause more justifiable because the former employer was not simply extracting 
a noncompetition agreement without giving the employee some measure of job security.  
 The second factor questions the method that the defendant utilized to interfere, as 
opposed to the purpose of the defendant‟s interference.  Even in an expectancy relationship, the 
new employer can still be subject to liability if he uses improper means to compete.
123
 The 
Restatement defines improper means as unlawful restraints on trade, fraud, physical violence and 
generally predatory means, but finds persuasion and limited economic pressure to be 
permissible.
124
  Indeed, simply making an at-will employee a better offer should not lead to tort 
liability.   
Finally, the defendant must proffer evidence establishing that his interference was for 
competitive purposes.  While this would be a fact-intensive inquiry depending on case-specific 
circumstances, the defendant should have at least some positive evidence of what his competitive 
plans were and how the employee fit into those plans. If the defendant is able to offer enough 
evidence to prove his fair competition affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it 
strips away the plaintiff‟s right to an award of punitive damages.  Even if the defendant is 
successful, however, the plaintiff still has an opportunity to recover otherwise available tort 
damages and potentially injunctive relief.  
3. The Plaintiff‟s Second Chance  
 Even if the defendant establishes its affirmative defense, the plaintiff can still seek 
otherwise remaining tort damages and injunctive relief. This inquiry focuses on the non-compete 
covenant and the circumstances surrounding it and is meant to be the analytical step that 
incorporates the protections of the tortious interference with contract claims. The court must first 
                                                          
123
 Restatement (Second) of Torts 768(1) & cmt. a. 
124
 Cavico, supra note 13, at 536-37 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 768(1) & cmt. e.; Lockheed Martin Corp. 
v. Atlas Commerce Inc., 725 N.Y.S.2d 722, 725-26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)).  
28 
 
determine whether the restrictive covenant is valid and enforceable.
125
 If the enforceability of the 
noncompetition agreement is established, the plaintiff is entitled to any monetary damages that it 
can prove with reasonable certainty.
126
 Of course, as the Restatement points out, the uncertainty 
inherent in prospective employment relationships is relevant to determining a damage award.
127
 
Once the plaintiff establishes the validity of the non-compete covenant, the court must 
examine the following factors to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate: (1) whether 
the plaintiff took other measures to protect the confidentiality of the claimed proprietary 
information; (2) the employer informed the employee of both the presence of the non-compete 
clause and its potential impact on the employee‟s future employment opportunities; and (3) that 
the employee, as a result of his position in the company,
128
 had access to proprietary information 
and used that information in performing his job.    
The first factor requires a showing that the information that the plaintiff seeks to protect 
is indeed proprietary. Typically, protectable interests are broken into two categories: (a) 
customer relationships and goodwill; and (b) confidential or secret business information.
129
  
Customer relationships and/or goodwill typically come into play with salespersons or customer 
account representatives that market products to clients.
130
  Noncompetition agreements that 
prohibit such employees from marketing comparable products in the same geographic region on 
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behalf of a competitor are commonly enforced by courts.
131
  Regarding business information, 
courts generally hold that employers do not have a protectable interest in an employee‟s “general 
skill or know-how.”
132
  The type of business information, however, that is protectable include: 




Plaintiffs can rest assured that the first factor will not impose undue cost or hardships on 
them; in fact, it should involve no more than a de minimis cost.  This involves being able to show 
that, inter alia, it noted that all confidential information was confidential and that it restricted 
access to the information to those individuals who reasonably needed it for their job 
performance.   
The second factor likewise will not require much by of increased costs. The plaintiff can 
satisfy this factor by simply pointing out the presence of the non-compete and briefly explaining 
of the legal significance of the restrictive covenant on the employee‟s future employment 
opportunities should their relationship terminate. This promotes social efficiency by making the 
non-compete covenant a more salient term.  
The third element is present as another method of ensuring that the plaintiff is not 
attempting to restrict competition per se by the use of his restrictive covenant and requires the 
plaintiff to show that the employee has knowledge that threatens the employer‟s legitimate and 
protectable business interests. Indeed, in order to “legitimize a noncompete agreement based on 
business information, an employer must do more than simply supply the employee with general 
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 Plaintiffs are likely to object to the above liability framework on several grounds – that 
the scheme is too protective of defendants, that it restricts the availability of punitive damages 
and imposes significant barriers to obtaining an injunction (because not only does it have to 
show his restrictive covenant is reasonable but also that he took extra measures to protect 
proprietary information).   
 While those concerns are not without merit, the policy reasons articulated throughout this 
Note justify imposition of this standard.  The liability framework does not favor one party over 
another – it is meant to promote fair competition and employee mobility while still protecting 
proprietary information. It safeguards that important public policy. Moreover, whatever 
increased burden is imposed on the plaintiff by the framework is placed on it because it is the 
one with access to the information and is not so significant so as to deter legitimate suits.  
Moreover, the former employer‟s objections are ameliorated by the fact that it will not always be 
the former employer. Indeed, looking through the ex ante lens, the liability framework proposed 
herein incentivizes employers to make attractive offers to at-will employees of their competitors. 
This framework discourages meritless litigation by making it less likely that plaintiffs will 
receive a financial windfall (via punitive damages) and also, significantly, making available the 
most valuable form of relief (an injunction) to employers who truly have legitimate business 
information to protect and took reasonable means to protect it beyond the mere routine insertion 
of a non-compete clause into their employment contracts. 
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 The employment-at-will doctrine is the bedrock of modern American employment 
jurisprudence.  Because either party to the employment agreement is free to terminate the 
relationship at almost any time for almost any reason, the rule naturally promotes freedom of 
contract and, with it, fair competition.  While the employment-at-will doctrine is the default rule 
in the vast majority of American jurisdictions, it is being limited by an increasing number of 
legislatively and judicially created exceptions. The erosion of the rule illustrates a jurisprudential 
policy favoring employees. This Note argues that policy logically extends to protecting 
employee mobility and, consequently, increased protection for the employee‟s new employer 
who acquired the at-will employee through lawful competition.  This lays the foundation for this 
Note‟s argument that there should be a narrow standard of liability under tortious interference 
claims under the factual scenario presented in this Note.  
 Building on that foundation, this Note argues that tortious interference claims with at-will 
employment relationships are properly classified as ones with prospective contractual relations.  
While an at-will agreement is a contract in one sense, it lacks the definiteness present in 
employment contracts containing temporal guarantees or just-cause restrictions. Those 
differences engender different expectations among the contracting parties which give rise to a 
more permissible array of interference behavior. Tortious interference with prospective 
contractual relations claims follow that lead and embrace lawful competition, holding that it is 
not unlawful interference.  
 The employer muddies the analysis by extracting a non-compete covenant from an at-will 
employee because, without the restrictive covenant, the employer can only hope that the 
employee shows up for work.  With the restrictive covenant, however, the employer has the 
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definite expectation that the employee will not compete against it. While this Note in no way 
disputes an employer‟s legitimately protectable interests, it argues that noncompetition 
agreements in at-will employment contracts cannot occupy the same legal force as other 
contracts because of the realities of the modern workplace, are not truly bargained for and 
involve a non-salient term. 
 With all that in mind, this Note proposes an analytical framework that fairly and 
competently addresses the problem by incorporating the freedom to compete embraced by the 
tortious interference with prospective contractual relations claims with some of the increased 
protections embodied in tortious interference with contract claims.  This liability framework 
prohibits improper financial windfalls to plaintiffs by eliminating punitive damages, but still 
permits them to seek the most valuable award, an injunction, to protect their truly proprietary 
information.  
 
